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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
AMENDMENTS AND RESERVATIONS TO THE
TREATY.
THE subject involves consideration of (I) the power of
organs of the United States to make reservations, (II) the legal
effect of reservations and (III) the expediency of making res-
ervations. The first is a question of constitutional law, the
second of international law, and the third of policy and ethics.
I. POWERS OF THE SENATE AND PRESIDENT.
"(The President) shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds
of the Senators present concur."'  That the Senate has power
to reject a treaty by refusing to "consent" to its ratification is
clear.2  That it can "advise" amendments or reservations,3 or
even make its "consent" conditional upon their acceptance is also
establishead4 though it has occasionally been questioned.' It is
I United States Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
2 Crandall, Treaties their Making and Enforcement, 2nd ed., p. 82 notes
seventeen cases of rejection of treaties by the Senate. All of these were
bi-lateral treaties.
3 Crandall, op. cit. pp. 67-72 notes eighteen instances, described as "ex-
ceptional" in which the advice of the Senate has been sought by the
president prior to negotiations and half of these occurred in the admin-
istration of Washington prior to negotiation of the Jay treaty (1794)
which established the precedent of Presidential independence in negotia-
tion. Only once was advice sought by the President in person and on that
occasion, a few months after the constitution went into operation, Presi-
dent Washing-ton's experiences were such that an eye witness described
his departure from the Senate chamber as "with sullen dignity" and
"a disconsolate air." Maclay, Sketches of Debates in the First Senate
of the -United States, G. W. Harris, ed., p. 125; 6 J. Q. Adams, Memoires,
427. The Senate on its own initiative has sometimes advised the con-
clusion of treaties, which advice the President is competent to ignore,
and it has claimed the right to confirm the agents negotiating the treaty,
but the use of special agents acting under the president's authority alone
is established in practice. Crandall, op. cit. 77; Corwin, The President's
Control of Foreign Relations, pp. 58 et seq. See on the general subject,
H. C. Lodge, 31 Scribners Magazine, 33. Sen. Doc. 104, 57th Cong., 1st
Sess. J. W. Foster, The Practice of Diplomacy, pp. 243, et seq.
4 Sutherland, Constitutional Power and World Affairs, p. 127; Cran-
dall, op. cit. p. 81; Lodge, loc. cit. Of over 650 treaties signed by the
United States, in about one-tenth the Senate has qualified its consent to
ratification, and this includes multi-lateral treaties, such as the Supple-
mentary Industrial Property Convention, (1891); the African Slave
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also evident that the President is the final authority in ratifying
as well as negotiating a treaty 6 and is under no obligation to sub-
mit a treaty, mutilated by Senate amendments or reservations to
the other signatory powers.7  Thus Presidents Roosevelt and
Taft each abandoned arbitration treaties when it appeared that
the Senate was prepared to insist upon essential alterations.8
When proposed reservations are of a character nullifying the
essential purpose of a treaty or unacceptable to the other signa-
tories this would seem to be the proper course and of these facts
the president who has conducted the negotiations is the most
competent judge. It would hardly tend toward international good
will to offer a stone when the signatories have agreed to buy
bread.
As is the case with the treaty itself, the President and Senate
must each consent to amendments, reservations or interpretations.
Attempts of either to act separately have been unavailing. The
Supreme Court said in reference to a joint, resolution passed by
a majority of the Senate, stating the purpose of the Senate in
ratifying the treaty annexing the Philippines :9
Trade General Act, (1890); the Algeciras Convention, (1906); and the
Hague Conventions, (1899, 1907). In most cases the other state or states
have assented to the qualification, but "The proposed treaty is not in-
frequently so amended as to be unacceptable to the other power and no
treaty results." Crandall, op. cit. p. 82. For instances see 5 Moore, In-
ternational Law Digest, 199-201. Senate Rule XXXVII, provides for
vote on amendments in committee of the whole and in session and then
on "a resolution of ratification with or without amendment." "On the
final question to advise and consent to the ratification in the form agreed
to, the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate present shall be necessary
to determine it in the affirmative, but all other motions and questions upon
a treaty shall be decided by a majority vote, except a motion to postpone
indefinitely, which shall be decided by a vote of two-thirds."
5 "The objection usually urged is that amendments are in the nature
of an ultimatum and are made by those not familiar with the prior nego-
tiations." Crandall, op. cit. p. 82. See also, Mr. Monroe, Minister to
Great Britain to Sec. of State, June 3, 1804, 3 Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., 93;
5 Moore, Digest, 201.
6 Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and his Powers, p. 106; Crandall, op.
cit. pp. 81, 94.
7 Crandall cites 13 instances in which the President refused to ratify
treaties in the form approved by the Senate, op. cit. p. 97 to which may be
added the two Taft Arbitration treaties of 1911. He also cites 10 in-
stances in which the President withdrew treaties while still under Senate
consideration, p. 95; 9 in which he withheld them from the Senate alto-
gether, p. 99; and 11 in which he submitted them to the Senate with rec-
ommendation for amendments, p. 97.
s Crandall, op. cit. p. 98; Taft, op. cit. p. 106; Charles, Treaties, etc.,
62nd Cong., 3rd Sess., Sen. Doc., No. 1063, p. 380.
9 Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, (1901) 183 U. S. 176, 46
L. Ed. 138, 22 S. C. R. 59. "The power to make treaties is vested by the
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"We need not consider the force and effect of a resolution of
this sort. . . .The meaning of the treaty can not be controlled
by subsequent explanations of some of those who may have voted
to ratify it." Justice Brown, concurring said:
"It can not be regarded as part of the treaty, since it received
neither the approval of the president nor the consent of the other
contracting power. . . . The Senate has no right to ratify the
treaty and introduce new terms into it, which shall be obligatory
upon the other power, although it may refuse its ratification, or
make such ratification conditional upon the adoption of amend-
ments to the treaty."
A similar fate has met interpretations or reservations made
by the President without consent of the senate, even when accept-
ed by the other signatory. Thus explanatory notes signed by the
plenipotentiaries on exchange of ratifications to the Mexican
peace treaty of 1848 and the Clayton-Bulwer' treaty with Great
Britain of 1850 were subsequently held by the United States to be
of no effect, 10 and on other occasions the president has submitted
such explanatory documents to the Senate before proclaiming the
treaty. 1
II. EFFECT OF RESERVATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The effect of reservations and amendments to treaties, though
often a matter of complexity in concrete application depends
constitution in the President and Senate, and while this proviso 'was
adopted by the Senate, there is no evidence that it ever received the sanc-
tion or approval of the President." N. Y. Indians v. United States, (1898)
170 U. S. 1, 42 L. Ed. 927, 18 S. C. R. 531. See also 5 Moore, Digest 210;
Crandall, op. cit., p. 88.
10 5 Moore, Digest, 205-206; Crandall, op. cit. pp. 85, 381. Bigelow,
Breaches of Anglo-American Treaties, pp. 116-149, discusses at length the
effectiveness of these and other documents alleged to be explantory of
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Secretary Root agreed by exchange of notes
with Mr. Bryce, British Ambassador, as to the meaning of Art. II of the
arbitration convention of 1908. These documents were submitted to the
Senate for its information but apparently not for its approval. Crandall,
op. cit. p. 89.
11 Jefferson thought it necessary to submit an interpretation offered by
Napoleon of the treaty of 1801 to the Senate before exchange of ratifi-
cations. Charles Francis Adams said that the British interpretation of
the Declaration of Paris, to which the United States desired to accede,
would have to be submitted to the Senate. Secretary Fish declared the
exchange of ratifications of a treaty with Turkey in 1874 was invalid
because accompanied by an explanation of the American plenipotentiary
which rendered a Senate amendment nugatory. Secretary Bayard refused
to give an explanation of a Senate amendment to the treaty with Hawaii
of 1884 and to authorize a protocol explaining the submarine cable con-
vention of 1886 without Senate approval. Crandall, op. cit. pp. 86-89; 5
Moore, Digest, 207. Although protocols prolonging the time for exchange
of ratifications have not always been submitted to the Senate, this has
usually been done. Crandall, op. cit. pp. 89-92.
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upon a single principle. "Treaties are contracts between states.
To their validity it is essential ... that consent be reciprocally
and regularly given."" "Assent must be to the same thing in the
same sense. It must comprehend the whole of the propo-
sition, must be exactly equal to its extent and provisions and
must not qualify them by any* new matter."'13 This statement,
made of private contracts, is believed to be equally applicable
to treaties, and under it, clearly no modification can be -effective
as to any party which has not consented to it.
"There is," said the Supreme Court in refusing to apply an
amendment to which the Indians had not consented, "something
which shocks the conscience in the idea that a treaty can be put
forth as embodying the terms of an arrangement with a foreign
power or an Indian tribe, a material provision of which is un-
known to one of the contracting parties, and is kept in the back-
ground to be used by the other only when the exigency of 'a par-
ticular case may demand it."'"
Various names have been given to proposals to modify treat-
ies. An amendment is a proposed modification of the terms of
the instrument. An interpretation is a proposed determination of
the meaning of the terms of the instrument. A reservation is an
amendment or interpretation stated as a condition of consent to
the terms of the instrument. An amendment is a more drastic
modification of a treaty than an interpretation. In fact the latter
may not be a modification at all. If it is simply a statement of the
meaning which a court applying international law would ascribe
1°-Crandall, op. cit. p. 3.
"3Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 14th ed., p. 154, tit. "Assent." There must
be both "consent" and "assent." The first is defined as "An act of the
will," Standard, or "a willingness that something about to be done, be
done," Bouvier, tit. assent; the latter as "an act of the understanding,"
Standard, or "approval of something done," Bouvier, loc. cit. An inter-
pretation not "assented" to would be as destructive of the complete agree-
ment necessary as would an amendment not "consented" to. There must
be a complete meeting of the minds. When as often happens there is not
in fact reciprocal "assent" to the meaning of words or phrases, the law
presumes assent to the meaning derived by application of recognized prin-
ciples of interpretation. Want of mutual "consent" on the other hand
renders the purported agreement, no agreement and void.
14N. Y. Indians v. United States, (1898) 170 U. S. 1, 42 L. Ed. 927,
18 S. C. R. 531. See also Brown, J., in Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
States, (1901) 183 U. S. 176, 46 L. Ed. 138, 22 S. C. R. 59. The Senate has
frequently taken the position that even interpretations, a fortiori amend-
ments, offered by other signatory powers must be approved by it, before
exchange of ratifications. Supra notes 10, 11. The Senate resolution
consenting to ratification of the General Act for the Suppression of the
American Slave Trade, (1890) expressly consented to the partial ratifica-
tion by France. Malloy, Treaties, etc., p. 1991.
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to the terms of the treaty it is from a legal standpoint entirely
superfluous. A reservation may be drastic or mild, but its dis-
tinguishing feature is that it qualifies consent to the treaty.
From the standpoint of international law, the distinction be-
tween amendments and interpretations is immaterial. Neither is
effective as against a non-consenting state.
The essential distinction from the standpoint of international
law is whether the modification does or does not qualify consent
to the treaty, i. e. whether it is or is not a reservation. If the
United States' ratification is qualified by reservations, then the
treaty will -not be valid as between the United States and any
signatory who does not consent to the. modifications. On the
other hand if the United States' ratification is not so qualified,
then the treaty will be valid as to all ratifying powers, while any
amendments or interpretations which may have been proposed,
will apply only as to those signatories who consent to them.
OBLIGATION TO RATIFY.
Since consent must be by the treaty-making authority of the
state, ratification by that authority, of a treaty signed by pleni-
potentiaries has become customary. i5 Early publicists denied the
existence of any discretion in this act, unless the plenipotentiaries
had exceeded their powers,1" and where their powers are derived
from the full treaty-making authority of the state, at least a moral
obligation to ratify seems to be recognized today.' 7 Thus in coun-
tries where treaty making is vested in the Crown, the signature
of plenipotentiaries wbo have acted within instructions given
them by the Crown should be regarded as final. The act of rati-
fication becomes mainly formal, unless discretion is expressly
reserved in the treaty itself, and the other signatory could take
exception either to its refusal or to its qualification."
15 Harley, The Obligation to Ratify Treaties, Am. J. Int. Law, July,
1919; Crandall, op. cit. 2; 5 Moore, Digest, 184 et seq.
162 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, c. 11, sec. 12; 2 Vattel, Le Droit
de Gens, c. 12, sec. 156; 2 Martens, Precis des Droit des Gens, c. 1, sec. 36.
17 After citing 5 authorities supporting an absolute obligation to ratify,
13 for a moral obligation, 8 for no obligation at all, and the circumstances
of 10 causes c~l~bres in which ratification was refused, Harley, loc. cit.
concludes, "It would seem that the weight of opinion holds that a moral
obligation to ratify exists." See also 5 Moore, Digest, 187.
'S The United States has sometimes protested the failure of other
powers to ratify treaties although, because of the constitutional need of
Senate approval, maintaining its own right to refuse. A claim conven-
tion signed with Spain in 1802 was rejected by the Senate but on new
evidence being presented, the Senate changed its mind. Now, however,
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The same situation would exist in the United States if the
President and two-thirds of the Senate had joined in instructing
plenipotentiaries. "The committee, to which the treaty of July
2, 1791, with the Cherokees, had been referred, observed, in its
report to the Senate, that the treaty strictly conformed to the in-
structions of the President based upon the advice and consent of
the Senate as given August 11, 1790," consequently ratification
became obligatory.19
Since however the early "attempts of the executive to follow
out the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution in con-
sulting the Senate prior to the opening of negotiations, have beeh
followed only in exceptional instances ' 20 and the negotiators of
treaties have ordinarily acted under authority of the President
alone, the Senate has asserted, and other powers have generally
admitted the right under international law of the full treaty power
Spain refused to ratify. "Were it necessary," replied Secretary Madison,
"to enforce these observations by an inquiry into the right of His Catholic
Majesty to withhold his ratification in this case, it would not be difficult
to show that it is neither supported by the principles of public law, nor
countenanced by the examples which have been cited." Madison to Yrujo,
Oct. 15, 1804, Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., 2: 625. The convention was finally
ratified by Spain in 181g. Almost immediately a similar controversy arose
over the Florida cession treaty. Secretary Adams said, "The President
consideis the treaty of 22nd February last as obligatory upon the honor
and good faith of Spain, not as a perfect treaty, ratification being an
essential formality to that, but as a compact which Spain was bound to
ratify." He then drew an analogy between an unratified treaty and a
covenant to convey land, asserting that "the United States have a perfect
right to do what a court of chancery would do in a transaction of similar
character between individuals, namely, to compel the performance of the
engagement as far as compulsion can accomplish it, and to indemnify
themselves for all the damages and charges incident to the necessity of
using compulsion." It should be noted that in the full powers of his
plenipotentiary, the Spanish monarch had expressly promised to ratify
"whatsoever may be stipulated and signed by you." 5 Moore, Digest,
189-190. In both of these cases the United States distinguished its own
position, in which the recognized constitutional rights of the Senate pre-
cluded an obligation to ratify.
19 Crandall, op. cit. p. 79. The first treaty to come before the Senate
after adoption of the constitution, the consular .convention with France,
signed in 1788, had in substance been submitted to Congress, in which the
treaty power was vested under Ithe Articles of Confederation, in 1784 and
was rejected on the ground that it did not conform to the original plan
proposed by -Congress, but with a promise to ratify one which did so
conform. This promise was repeated in the commission to Jefferson as
Minister to France, and the new treaty was signed accordingly. On his
advice being asked, John Jay, who continued in charge of foreign affairs,
replied that "while he apprehended that the new convention would prove
more inconvenient than beneficial to the United States, the circumstances
under which it had been negotiated made, in his opinion, its ratification
by the Senate indispensable." The Senate immediately proceeded to
ratify. Crandall, op. cit. p. 79.
20 Crandall, op. cit. p. 70. See also supra, note 3
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of the United States to refuse or qualify2 ratification of a treaty
duly signed by the plenipotentiaries. Frequently this right is ex-
pressly reserved in the treaty,2  but foreign states are presumed
to be cognizant of the composition of the treaty power of the
states with which they deal, and of the resulting incapacity of
plenipotentiaries with authority derived from only part of it. 23
21 Qualified ratification has sometimes been objected to, where the right
of rejection is admitted. Supra, note 5. Doubtless where many states are
involved a qualified ratification is undesirable. Protocol No. 24 of the
Paris Congress of 1856 provided with reference to the Declaration of
Paris, "On the proposition of Count Walewski, and recognizing that it is
for the general interest to maintain the indivisibility of the four prin-
ciples mentioned in the declaration signed this day, the plenipotentiaries
agree that the powers which shall have signed it, or which shall have
acceded to it, can not hereafter enter into any arrangement in regard to the
application of the right of neutrals in time of war, which does not at the
same time rest on the four principles which are the object of the said
declaration." This was recognized as a binding obligation on the powers
and as a result the -United States being unwilling to accept one provision
of the Declaration was excluded from the treaty, a situation which proved
most disadvantageous upon the outbreak of the Civil war five years later.
Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1905, p. 110. Article 65 of
the proposed Declaration of London of 1909 provided: "The Provisions
of the present Declaration form an indivisible whole." Upon which, the
drafting committee, of which M. Renault was chairman, commented as
follows: "This article is of great importance, and is in conformity with
that which was adopted in the Declaration of Paris. The rules contained
in the present Declaration relate to matters of great importance and great
diversity. They have not all been accepted with the same degree of
eagerness by all the Delegations; some concessions have been made on
one point in consideration of concessions obtained on another. The whole,
all things considered, has been recognized as satisfactory. A legitimate
expectation would be defeated if one Power might make reservations on
a rule to which another Power attached particular importance." Ibid.
1909, p. 155. See also Harley, loc. cit.
22 Crandall, op. cit. p. 94.
23 "Without doubt a government should know the various phases that
the project must follow at the hands of the other contractant; it is not
able to raise reclamations if the treaty fails in one of these phases."
Geffcken, note to Heffter, Das Europaische V61kerrecht der gegenwart,
p. 201. "The maxim of the early Roman law, 'qui cum alio contrahit,
vel est vel debet esse non ignarus condicienis eius,' Ulpian, Digest L.
XVII, 19 applies in the making of treaties. To know the power of him
with whom negotiations, are conducted requires a knowledge not only of
his special mandate and powers, the exhibition of which may always be
demanded before the opening of the negtiations, but also of the funda-
mental law or constitution of the state which he professes to represent,
and of any limitations which may result from an incomplete sovereignty."
Crandall, op. cit. p. 2. "This question (the obligation to ratify) has no
significance in regard to states, by whose form of government the engage-
ments made by the executive with foreign powers need some further
sanction." Woolsey, International Law, sec. 111. "The Government of
His Brittanic Majesty is well acquainted with the provision of the Con-
stitution of the United States, by which the Senate is a component part
of the treaty making power, and that the consent and advice of that
branch of Congress are indispensable in the formation of treaties. Ac-
cording to the practice of this government, the Senate is not ordinarily
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EXPRESS CONSENT.
Though the United States can not be reproached with violation
of international law if it refuses to ratify or qualifies its ratifica-
tion of a treaty signed by authority of the President alone, yet a
qualified ratification is of no effect unless consented to by the other
signatories. How may this consent be evidenced? Express con-
sent to reservations by statement in the act of ratification or ex-
change of notes would of course be sufficient, 24 as would accept-
consulted in the initiatory state of a negotiation, but its consent and
advice are only invoked, after a treaty is concluded, under the direction
of the President, and submitted to its consideration." Mr. Clay, Sec. of
State to Mr. Addington, British Minister, April 6, 1825, 5 Moore, Digest,
200. See also ibid. 5: 189, 198, 199, and supra, note 21. Though knowl-
edge of the constitutional authorities necessary for the conclusion of a
treaty may be presumed, knowledge of the authorities necessary for the
execution of a treaty may not. When a treaty is concluded in the consti-
tutional method, it is an obligation, which can not be escaped on the plea
of need for legislation to execute. The legislature will sacrifice the good
faith of the country and render it liable to international reclamation if
it refuses to act. (Infra notes 49, 50.)
24 The Senate advised ratification of the treaty with France of Feb.
3, 1801, provided a new article be substituted for article II. Bonaparte
ratified with this modification but added a new proviso. Ratifications were
exchanged at Paris, but before proclamation President Jefferson resub-
mitted the treaty to the Senate which accepted Bonaparte's proviso.
Malloy, Treaties, etc., p. 505. After consenting to ratification of the
General act for the suppression of the African Slave Trade (1890), the
Senate "Resolved further, That the Senate advise and consent to the
acceptance of the partial ratification of the said General Act on the part
of the French Republic, and to the stipulations relative thereto, as set
forth in the protocol signed at Brussels, January 2, 1892." It then made
a reservation on its own behalf. The protocol of deposit of ratifications
of Feb. 2, 1892, provided for in article 99, of the treaty, recites the Sen-
ate's resolution and states: "This resolution of the Senate of the United
States having been preparatively and textually conveyed by the Govern-
ment of His Majesty the King of the Belgians to the knowledge of all the
signatory powers of the General Act, the latter, have given their assent to
its insertion in the present Protocol which will remain annexed to the
Protocol of January 2nd, 1892." Malloy, Treaties, etc., p. 1992. In the
treaty of 1911, Japan gave express assent to an "understanding" and tacit
assent to an "amendment"' The proclamation of President Taft reads:
"And whereas, the advice and consent of the Senate of the United
States to the ratification of the said Treaty was given with the under-
standing 'that the treaty shall not be deemed to repeal or affect any of
the provisions of the Act of Congress entitled 'An Act to regulate the
Immigration of Aliens into the United States,' approved February 20th,
1907 ;'
And whereas, the said understanding has been accepted by the Gov-
ernment of Japan;
And whereas, the said Treaty, as amended by the Senate of the United
States, has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the
two governments were exchanged in the City of Tokyo, on the fourth day
of April, one thousand nine hundred and eleven;
Now, therefore, be it known that I, William Howard Taft, President
of the United States of America, have caused the said Treaty, as amended,
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ance without objection of an official note stating such reserva-
tions.25 'The power proposing reservations can presume that the
terms of such a note have been consented to by all the organs
constituting the treaty power of the states to whom it is sent.
If in fact, it has not received such consent, there has been a viola-
tion of the constitutional law of the receiving state, but under
international law the reservation would be binding. Thus inter-
pretative agreements signed by- authority of the President upon
exchange of ratifications of treaties with Mexico (1848) and
Great Britain (1850) though not valid under the law of the Unit-
ed States because of failure to submit them to the senate, were
doubtless valid under international law and might have been made
the basis of valid claims before an international tribunal.2 6
TACIT CONSENT TO QUALIFIED RATIFICATION.
Tacit consent to reservations is also possible. The process of
concluding treaties involves three steps: signature, ratification,
and exchange of ratifications. -The first and last are formal cere-
monies and suitable occasions for the proposal of reservations.
It would appear that if such proposals are stated as conditions of
consent by the proposing power, on either of these occasions, lack
of protest by others would be construed as tacit consent. At the
and the said understanding to be made public, to the end that the same
and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with
good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof. In testimony
whereof, etc." Charles, Treaties, etc., p. 82. An interpretation proposed
by the Senate to the treaty of 1868 with the North German Confederation
was duly communicated to that government and accepted as the true
interpretation of the article. It was, however, omitted in the exchange
copy given by that government. This omission being noticed later, a spe-
cial protocol was signed in 1871, recognizing the interpretation. Crandall,
op. cit. p. 88.
25 In negotiating the treaty of 1850 with Switzerland, the American
negotiator agreed that the unqualified most-favored-nation clause of
article 10 should be interpreted absolutely. In 1898, Switzerland claimed,
under this clause, the benefits offered to France under a reciprocity agree-
ment of May 30, 1898. At first the United States objected that to admit
the claim would be contrary to her accepted interpretation of identical
most-favored-nation clauses, but "It was found upon an examination of
the original correspondence that the President of the United States was
advised of the same understanding and that the dispatch in which it was
expressed was communicated to the Senate when the treaty was submitted
for its approval," consequently customs officials were directed to admit
Swiss importations at the reduced rate. 5 Moore, Digest, 284.
26 Supra, note 10. Mexico and Great Britain respectively asserted the
validity of these agreements. 5 Moore, 205; Lord Clarendon to Mr.
Buchanan, May 2, 1854, Br. and For. St. Pap., 46: 267, Moore, 3: 138. The
Mexican agreement is printed after the Treaty in Malloy, Treaties, etc.,
p. 1119.
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Hague Conferences, the numerous reservations offered upon
signature of the Conventions and maintained by the power upon
ratification were accorded tacit consent in this manner.
2 7
Where the usual process prevails,-of exchanging ratifications
by formal meeting of the plenipotentiaries, generally recorded in
a protocol, acceptance by a plenipotentiary of a text with qualified
ratification would amount to tacit consent to the reservation.
Thus in reference to an explanation attached by the king of Spain
to his ratification of the Florida cession treaty of 1819, the
Supreme Court said :28
"It is too plain for argument that where one of the parties
to a treaty at the time of its ratification annexes a written decla-
ration explaining ambiguous language in the instrument or adding
a new and distinct stipulation and the treaty is afterwards ratified
by the other party with the declaration attached to it and the rati-
fications duly exchanged, the declaration thus annexed is a part of
the treaty and as binding and obligatory as if it were inserted in
the body of the instrunient. The intention of the parties is to be
gathered from the whole instrument as it stood when the ratifica-
tions were exchanged."
In multi-lateral treaties, however, this procedure has been
often abandoned and provision made for deposit of ratifications
at a central bureau. This was provided in the African Slave
Trade, Algeciras, Hague, and other Conventions. In the present
treaty article 440 provides:
"The present treaty of which the French and English texts
are both authentic, shall be ratified.-
The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris as soon as
possible.
Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe,
will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French
Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that
27 The Marie Glaeser, L. R. [1914] P. 218; The Appam, (1916) 243 U. S.
124, 61 L. Ed. 633, 37 S. C. R. 377, Infra Note 38. In most cases reserva-
tions were offered at signature and affirmed at ratification though sometimes
they were offered for the first time at ratification. Thus the Senate reso-
lution advising ratification of the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes affirmed the declaration made by the
American plenipotentiaries on signature and added a new reservation.
Malloy, Treaties, etc., p. 2247. The reservations with statement of the
method of presentment are given in full in the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace edition of the Hague Conventions and Declarations
of 1899 and 1907 Presumably a reservation made at signature but not
maintained at ratification is not effective.
28 Doe v. Braden, (1853) 16 How. (U.S.) 635, 14 L. Ed. 1090. See
also Crandall, p. 88.
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their ratification has been given; in that case they" riust transmit
the instrument of ratification as soon as possible. -
A first proc~s-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be
drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Germany
on the one hand, and by three of Principal Allied and Associated
Powers on the other hand.
From the date of this first proc~s-verbal the Treaty will come
into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified
it. For the determination of all periods of time provided for in
the present Treaty this date will be the date of the coming into
force of the Treaty.
In all other respects the Treaty will enter into force for each
Power at the date of the deposit of its ratification.
The French Government will transmit to all the signatory
Powers a certified copy of the procfs-verbaux of the deposit of
ratifications."
It is believed that qualified ratifications might be deposited in
the method provided but if upon receipt of the procfs-verbal of the
deposit of such qualified ratification, an signatory objected to
the reservations, the treaty would not be in effect as between
those signatories. As to signatories offering no objection the
reservations would be regarded as tacitly consented to, and the
treaty would be in effect as from the date of deposit of ratifica-
tions. Thus it might, and if reservations were submitted materi-
ally modifying the treaty, probably would happen, that a deposit
of qualified ratification by the United States would result in con-
clusion of the treaty with some signatories but not with others.
If it were felt desirable to c6nclude a treaty with the latter, as
would doubtless be the case were they enemy powers, new nego-
tiations would be necessary.2 9 In other words if the United
29 The following draft of a Protocol of Jan. 2, 1892, is printed in Mal-
Ioy, Treaties, etc., p. 1990, following the African Slave Trade General act
of 1890:
"The undersigned, . . . met at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at
Brussels, in pursuance of Article XCIX of the General Act of July 2, 1890,
and in execution of the Protocol of July 2, 1891, with a view to preparing
a certificate of the deposit of the ratifications of such of the signatory
powers as were unable to make such deposit at the meeting of July 2,
1891.
"His Excellency the Minister of France declared that the President of
the Republic, in his ratification of the Brussels General Act had provi-
sionally reserved, until a subsequent understanding should be reached,
Articles XXI, XXII, XXIII, and XLII to LXI. The representatives
S... acknowledged to the Minister of France the deposit of the ratifica-
tions of the President of the French Republic, as well as of the exception
bearing upon Articles XXI, XXII, XXIII, and XLII to LXI.
"It is understood that the powers which have ratified the General Act
in its entirety, acknowledge that they are reciprocally bound as regards
all its clauses.
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States attached any reservation or interpretation however mild,
to her ratification as a condition thereof, Germany would have it
within her power and right to object to such qualification and com-
pel the United States to negotiate peace with her separately, or
from. the international standpoint continue in a state of war.3"
It may seem strange that a power making qualified ratification
should be able to throw the burden of positive action upon signa-
tories who have already unconditionally ratified and who object
to any qualification of the treaty. Practice, however, in the Alge-
ciras, Hague and other general international conventions seems
to sanction the method. Reservations, in some cases not present-
ed at signature, have been held to have received tacit consent upon
the deposit of ratifications so qualified.31
CONSENT TO AMENDMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS NOT QUALIFY-
ING RATIFICATION.
If, however, amendments or interpretations are presented and
ratification is not conditioned upon their acceptance, a failure to
"It is likewise understood that these powers shall not be bound toward
those which shall have ratified it partially, save within the limits of the
engagements assumed by the latter powers.
"Finally, it is understood that, as regards the powers that have par-
tially ratified, the matters forming the subject of Articles XLII to LXI,
shall continue, until a subsequent agreement is adopted to be governed
by the stipulations and arrangements now in force.
"In testimony whereof . . "
The United States Senate resolution of ratification expressly accepted
the French reservation and made another which was consented to by the
powers prior to deposit of ratification. Supra note 24.
30 Though -Congress might declare peace by resolution which would be
valid in municipal law, it would have no effect under international law
and Germany would be entitled to regard herself as still at war. "I have
yet to learn that a war in which the belligerents, as was the case with the
late civil war, are persistent and determined can be said to have closed
until peace is conclusively established, either by treaty when the war is
foreign, or when civil by proclamation of the termination of hostilities
on one side and the acceptance of such proclamation on the other." Mr.
Bayard, Sec. of State to Mr. Muruaga, Spanish Minister, Dec. 3, 1886,
7 Moore, 337.
31 A Senate reservation to the Algeciras Convention of 1906 was in the
same spirit but different terms from a reservation attached to American
signature of the treaty. Apparently the qualified ratification was accepted
when deposited as required by article 121 of the treaty. Malloy, Treaties,
etc., p. 2183. The Proc~s-Verbal of Deposit of Ratifications to the Inter-
national Sanitary Convention of 1903 notes reservations attached to the
ratifications of the ,United States, Great Britain, and Persia, which ap-
parently were tacitly accepted. Ibid. p. 2129. In the First Hague Conven-
tion of 1907 a reservation in addition to that made at signature by the
United States appears to have been tacitly accepted on deposit of ratifi-
cations, Ibid. p. 2247, and this was true of other Hague Conventions.
See supra note 27.
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object would be construed as rejection of the amendment or inter-
pretation but acceptance of the ratification. If the United States
deposited ratifications and at the same time suggested amend-
ments or interpretations it would be bound by treaty to all the
ratifying powers, but the amendments or interpretations would
be effective only as between those who expressly consented to
them.3
2
If, in such circumstances, the United States acted on the
basis of such amendments as to powers which had not expressly
consented to them, it would be a violation of the treaty, which
would become voidable at the discretion of such power. The
situation would be similar to that discussed in the Charlton case.
Italy refused to extradite her own citizens to the United States
as she was obliged to do under the terms of the treaty. Upon
Italy requesting the extradition of an American citizen from the
United States, the request was granted, the Supreme Court say-
ing :3
"If the attitude of Italy was as contended, a violation of the
obligation of the treaty, which in international law, would have
justified the United States in denouncing the treaty as no lInger
obligatory, it did not automatically have that effect. If the United
States elected not to declare its abrogation, or come to a rupture,
the treaty would remain in force. It was only.voidable, not void;
32 See protocol with reference to African Slave Trade General Act,
supra note 29. In the resolution giving consent to the treaty of 1911 with
Japan portions of an exchange of notes on the so-called gentlemen's
agreement limiting Japanese immigration were incorporated. This reser-
vation, however, was not included by the President in the formal ratifi-
cation, express assent having already been given by Japan. Supra note
24. Frequently Senate reservations relate to domestic matters not suit-
able for submission to the other power. Thus instructions to the Presi-
dent as to future treaty negotiations contained in the resolution consent-
ing to ratification of the Korean treaty of 1882, Malloy, Treaties, etc.,
p. 340, Crandall, op. cit. p. 77 and a stipulation requiring the issue of a
certificate by the President before ratification of the treaty contained in
the Senate resolution consenting to ratification of the Military Service
convention with Great Britain of June 3, 1918, were not included in the
acts of ratification. With such matters, the other power clearly has no
concern and the same would be true of reservations describing the manner
in which the treaty is to be executed, e. g., it is clear that an appropria-
tion or a declaration of war require congressional action, but this is a
constitutional, not an international matter, so a Senate reservation on the
subject would not be a proper subject for submission to the other signa-
tories. Their consent to such a reservation could not increase the rights
of Congress under the constitution or -diminish its obligation to perform
acts necessary for the execution of a treaty. See Memorandum by D. H.
Miller, Oct. 25, 1919.
3 Charlton vs. Kelly, (1913) 229 U. S. 447, 468, 57 L. Ed. 1274, 33
S. C. R. 945.
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and if the United States should prefer, it might waive any breach
which in its judgment had occurred and conform to its own obli-
gations as if there had been no such breach. 7 Kent's Corm.,
p. 175."
Under such circumstances the United States might be a party
to the treaty and act upon its amendments for years but always
under sufferance of powers who protested such action.
The effect of interpretations officially declared by the United
States but not as a qualification to its ratification would be some-
what different. Certainly the United States could not be accused
of bad faith in acting upon such interpretations. On the other
hand, signatories which had not expressly consented to such inter-
pretations would not be estopped from asserting a different one.
Future agreement or the decision of an international tribunal
would be necessary to settle the matter, after which insistence by
either party on a contrary interpretation would be a violation of
the treaty and grounds for voidance.
CONSENT BY ACQUIESCENCE IN ADVERSE ACTION.
If, however, non-consenting powers refrained from protest
and acquiesced for a long period of time in action by the United
States on the basis of such amendments or interpretations, it
would probably be-construed as tacit consent. Practice is recog-
nized as a source for interpreting treaties. Thus the Spanish
treaty claims commission felt justified in applying article VII of
the treaty with Spain of 1795, which forbade the "embargo or
detention" of "vessels or effects" of subjects or citizens of the
other contracting power, to detention of, goods on land. The
negotiators of the treaty appear to have intended application only
to property at sea. No question was raised for over seventy
years, after which the United States consistently maintained
the broad interpretation. 4
"Whether or not," said the court, "the clause was originally
intended to embrace real estate and personal property on land as
well as vessels and their cargoes, the same has been so construed
by the United States, and this construction has been concurred in
by Spain; and therefore the commission will adhere to such con-
struction in making its decisions."
INTERPRETATIONS AS EVIDENCE OF MEANING OF TREATY.
Non-conditional interpretations, though not binding unless
expressly consented to, or unless action under them had been
34 General principles adopted April 28, 1903, No. 10, Special Report of
Win. E. Fuller, Washington, 1907, p. 23; Crandall, op. cit. p. 384.
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acquiesced in for a long time, would be admissible as evidence
of the true meaning of the treaty. The intent of the negotiators
is recognized as a source for interpreting treaties, and preliminary
correspondence, official interpretations and contemporary discus-
sion are frequently introduced as evidence of this intent. This
has been especially frequent in interpreting boundary treaties
where the description does not correspond to geographical facts
as subsequently ascertained."5 An instance of a different kind
occurred in connection with a treaty concluded by the United
States with Switzerland in 1850. Contemporary correspondence
evidenced an intention on the part of both parties to interpret
the general most-favored-nation clause unconditionally. Thus
fifty years later the United States interpreted the clause in this
treaty contrary to its usual view, saying :36
"Both justice and honor require that the common understand-
ing of the high contracting parties at the time of the. executing
of the treaty should be carried into effect."
Such material, however, is only persuasive and will not over-
rule the clear meaning of the text. Thus the French Prize Court
held that the opinion of the drafting committee that reservists
were not "persons embodied in the armed forces of the enemy"
was not conclusive of the meaning of article 47 of the Declara-
tion of London. Consequently the court justified the taking of
enemy reservists from a Spanish vessel holding that in fact they
were embodied in the armed forces.3 7 An interpretation offered
by only one signatory power would of course be of less weight
than one which had been the subject of general correspondence
among the signatories.
RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF RESERVATIONS.
States which have consented to reservations whether express-
ly or tacitly are entitled to reciprocal application of the reserva-
tions, provided the rights of third states who are parties to the
treaty but have not consented to the reservation are not involved.
Thus in signing the VI Hague Convention of -1907, Germany
reserved on article 3, which exempted from confiscation, *enemy
merchant vessels met at sea ignorant of hostilities. Although
Great Britain had signed and ratified the Convention -without
reservation, the prize court held that a German vessel captured in
3 Crandall, op. cit. p. 377 et seq.
36 5 Moore, Digest, 284; Crandall, op. cit. p. 382.
7 Tie Federico, Decision du Conseil d'Etat, July 18, 1916, Hall, In-
ternational Law, Higgins, ed., 1917, p. 741.
TREATY AMENDMENTS AND RESERVATIONS
this situation could be confiscated. Germany was not entitled to
the privilege which by her reservation she refused to -others.8
RESERVATIONS ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS.
The interpretation of a treaty should undoubtedly be an inter-
national matter, that is, it should be settled by the application
of established principles of international law is possible, other-
wise by agreement of the parties.33 To assure- such interpreta-
tion there should be appeal to an international tribunal. The
impropriety of having a party judge in his own case applies to
international as well as private litigation,40 consequently in arbi-
38 The Marie Glaeser, L. R. [1914] P. 218. This rule was -expressly
stated in the Protocol of deposit of ratifications of the General Act for
the Suppression of African Slave Trade, (1890), supra, note 29. The
effect of a reservation was considered by the Supreme Court in the case
of the Appam, (1916) 243 U. S. 124, 61 L. Ed. 633, 37 S. C. R. 377.
The United States had ratified the XIII Hague Convention of 1907,
with reservation of article 23, which provided for the sequestration of
prizes in neutral ports. Germany had ratified without reserving on this
article, and Great Britain had not ratified at all. The Appani, a British
vessel captured by Germany, was sent into an American port for seques-
tration. The British owners sought restoration of the vessel and won.
Though the treaty probably was not applicable at all, because by article
28 it was applicable only in wars where all belligerents were parties, the
reservation was held to be persuasive of the attitude of the United States
and to justify her in a refusal to permit sequestration of prizes. Here,
so far as the reservation was effective it operated against Germany which
had not reserved on that article, but had tacitly accepted the reservation
of the United States. If the tables should ever be turned, Germany -would
be justified in refusing sequestration to American prizes. Where there is
a one-sided interpretation of a treaty, not assented to but tolerated, the
rule of reciprocal application does not apply. "It should moreover be
observed that even though the action of the-Italian Government be re-
garded as a breach of the treaty, the treaty is binding until abrogated,
and therefore the treaty not having been abrogated, its provisions aie
operative against us." Charlton v. Kelly, (1913) 229 U. S. 447, 57 L. Ed.
1274, 33 S. C. R. 945.
39 Wright, Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of Powers in the
United States, 12 Am. J. Int. Law, 92.
:40 Lords Hobart, Coke, Holt and others held that to make a man judge
in his own case was so contrary to natural equity that even an act of
Parliament attempting to do so would be void. Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co.
Rep. 113b, 118a; Day v. Savadge, (1610) Hob. 85, 87; City of London v.
Wood, (1701) 12 Mod. 669, 687; I Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law,
47 et seq. In Bates' Case, (1606-10) 2 Howell St. Tr. 371, Darrel's Case,
(1629) 3 Howell St. Tr. 1, and others the right of the king to judge his
own competence in matters of the prerogative was admitted with the result
according to *Anson that "all attempts to define the prerogative by rules
of law were rendered nugatory." Law and Custom of the Constitution,
2nd ed. Vol. 2, p. 30. These precedents have been long since overruled and
the prerogative has become subject to law. "If the c6urt is to decide
judicially in accordance with what it conceives to be 'the law of nations,
it can not -even in doubtful cases, take its directions from the Crown,
which is a party to the proceedings. It must itself determine what the
law is according to the best of its ability, and its-view, with whatever
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tration treaties, the interpretation of treaties has frequently been
declared a justiciable question suitable for compulsory arbitra-
tion,41 and the United States courts have held that the interpre-
tation of treaties may always be submitted to international
agreement or arbitration, individual rights to the contrary notwith-
standing.42  National courts in interpreting treaties are accus-
tomed to apply international law and have held that interpreta-
tions of their own government are not necessarily binding if not
accepted by the other party,43 though doubtless they show a par-
tiality to such interpretations 44  There is however, one exception,
namely 'where execution of the treaty is the duty of a political
organ of government. In such cases national courts are obliged
to follow the interpretation of the political organs of their own
government. 45  Consequently if the United States reserved free-
dom of action in making war, withdrawing from the League, or
other matter within the province of Congress or the President to
execute, it would also be within their province to decide whether
the reservation is binding, so far as national law- is concerned,
and United States courts would have to assent. An international
court, on the other hand, would be competent to interpret the
hesitation it be arrived at, must prevail over any executive order." The
Zamora, L. R. [19161 2 A. C. 77. Vattel lays it down as a principle for
interpreting treaties, "Neither of the parties who have an interest in the
contract or treaty may interpret it after his own mind." Op. cit. II, c.
17, sec. 265. As Bishop Hoadley said "whoever hath an absolute author-
ity to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law
giver to all intents and purposes." Sermon preached- before the king,
1717, 15th ed. p. 12; Gray, Nature and Sources 'of th Law, pp. 100,
120. Obligations are of little avail if the parties reserve complete liberty
of interpretation.
41 See I Hague Conventions, 1907, art. 38; Treaties concluded by
United States with Great Britain and other countries, 1908, Art. 1,
(Malloy, Treaties, etc. p. 814); League of Nations Covenant, Art. XIII.
42 Lattimer v. Poteet, (1840) 14 Pet. (U.S.) 4, 14, 10 L. Ed. 328. The
supply of omissions must be by international action. National courts
will not sanction a cy pros performance. The Amiable Isabella, (1821).
6 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 71-73, 5 L. Ed. 191. See also Crandall, op. cit. pp.
225, 387.
4 Wilson v. Wall, (1867) 6 Wall. (U.S.) 83, 89, 18 L. Ed. 727; N. Y.
Indians v. United States, (1898) 170 U. S. 1, 42 L. Ed. 927, 18 S. -C. R.
531; Castro v. De Uriarte, (1883) 16 Fed. 93; 5 Moore, Digest, 208;
Baldwin, 35 Am. Law Rev. 222; Crandall, op. cit. p. 364.
44.United States courts have always maintained the American inter-
pretation of the most-favored-nation clause, Whitney v. Robertson,
(1881) 124 U. S. 190, 31 L. Ed. 386, 8 S. C. R. 456. See also Charlton
v. Kelly, (1913) 229 U. S. 447, 468, 57 L. Ed. 1274, 33 S. C. R. 945.
45 Foster v. Neilson, (1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 253, 309, 71 L. Ed. 415; Doe
v. Braden, (1853) 16 How. (U.S.) 635, 14 L. Ed. 1090; 5 Moore, Digest
208, 241; Crandall, op. cit. pp. 364 et seq.
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effect of such a reservation .on grounds of international law as
would other parties to the treaty who might be affected by the
American interpretation. Thus while under national law a reser-
vation of this character would doubtless be binding even if other
signatories to the treaty had not consented, such would not be the
case under international law.4 6
III. EXPEDIENCY OF MAKING RESERVATIONS,
Assuming that the United States is favorable to the general
policy of the treaty and that reservations are not a mere cloak for
rejection, the expediency of making reservations seems to depend
upon (1) the effect of the article in question upon international
relations and national policy, (2) the probability of the reser-
vation being accepted, and (3) the extent to which the United
States is committed to the article. The first question is one upon
which discussion has largely centered and will not be considered
here.
4 7
PROBABILITY OF CONSENT.
The second question is however, of primary importance for
while reservations on a particular article taken by itself might
seem desirable, yet should it appear that such reservation -would
result in exclusion of the United States from the treaty a dif-
ferent decision might be reached. This consideration relates only
to reservations, i. e., proposals qualifying ratification, and the
probability of rejection by other signatories would of course
depend upon the substance rather than the form of the reser-
vation. Numerous considerations must always be weighed in
forming a judgment on question of policy, and the ones here
discussed are regarded by the writer, not as necessarily con-
clusive, but as of great importance.
46 In re Cooper, (1892) 143 U. S. 472, 502, 36 L. Ed. 232, 12 S.
C. R. 453, the Supreme Court held that interpretation of the reference in
a statute to "all the dominions of the United States in Behring Sea"
was a political question, but before the Behring Sea arbitration court
the extent of these dominions became a judicial question. 1 Moore,
Digest 744, 912, et. seq. In Harold v. Arrington, (1885) 64 Tex. 232,
234, the Texas Supreme Court held that determination of the northern
boundary of the state was a political question and followed the decision
of the political authorities of Texas, but before the Supreme Court of
the United States which exercised an international jurisdiction as be-
tween Texas and Oklahoma territory, the question became judicial.
-United States v. Texas, (1891) 143 U. S. 621, 36 L. Ed. 285, 12 S. C.
R. 488.
47 The writer has attempted to consider some of these effects in an
article in the American Political Science Review, November, 1919.
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The possibility of Germany refusing consent to reservations
should be given due consideration. By the treaty she sacrifices
claim to considerable sums in the hands of the Alien Property
Custodian, yields valuable commercial privileges, agrees to indem-
nify American citizens for property seized in Germany, and
makes other concessions, some of which are probably in excess
of her liability under international law.48
It would not seem unreasonable for -German statesmen to
anticipate better terms in a treaty negotiated independently with
the United States at a time when renewed military pressure was
not to be feared.
While the Allied Powers would probably consent to bona fide
interpretative reservations, they might properly hesitate before
entering into a league with a state whose cooperation was not to
be counted on in emergencies.49 Some of the proposed reserva-
tions relating to the use of military force and embargoes might
be construed as tending toward this effect. Certainly the discre-
tion of Congress should not be impaired, but it should be recog-
nized that it is a discretion to decide on the action necessary to
carry out the responsibilities assumed under the treaty. No sug-
gestion should exist of a liberty on the part of Congress or any
other organ to repudiate such responsibilities."
48 Summarized in the minority report of the Senate committee on
Foreign Relations, Sept. 11, 1919, 66 Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Rep. 176,
part. 2.
49 Referring to those who "insist and profess to believe that treaties
like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure," Jay wrote in
the Federalist, No. 64, "This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this
country, but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear. These
gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for
a bargain, and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would
rfiake any bargain with us which should be binding on them absohtely,
but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound
by it."
50 "The government of the United States presumes that whenever a
treaty has been duly concluded and ratified by the acknowledged authori-
ties competent for that purpose, an obligation is thereby imposed upon
each and every department of the government to carry it into complete
effect, according to its terms, and that on the performande of this obliga-
tion consists the due observance of good faith among nations." Mr.
Livingston, Sec. of State to Mr. Serurier, June 3, 1833, 2 Wharton,
International Law Digest, 67. "The extent to which Congress would
regard itself as bound, as a matter of good faith, to enact legislation for the
purpose of carrying out treaties has been the subject of debate, from
time to time, since the days of Washington. Despite these debates,
and notwithstanding its power to frustrate the carrying out of treaties,
Congress in a host of instances has passed the necessary legislation to
give them effect; and the disposition has frequently been manifested to
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Reservations definitely opposing concessions made to specific
powers could hardly be expected to receive the consent of those
powers. Thus Japan would be unlikely to consent to a reserva-
tion relating to her succession to former German rights in
China," and the British Dominions to one depriving them of
votes.
5 2
RESPONSIBILITIES ASSUMED BY THE UNITED STATES.
The third question relates to moral responsibilities, by which
the writer understands, a responsibility the specific application of
which belongs to the free interpretation of the parties. A legal
responsibility should be interpreted by an impartial authority
external to both parties-no one should be judge in his own
avoid any basis for the charge of bad faith through a disregard of
treaty stipulations." After considering the possibility that Congress
might refuse to hold itself under a moral obligation Mr. Hughes con-
tinues: "Foreign nations, however, might be expected to take the view
that they were not concerned with our internal arrangements and that
it was the obligation of the United States to see that the action claimed
to have been agreed upon was taken. If that action was not taken,
although Congress refused to act because it believed it was entitled to
refuse, we should still be regarded as guilty of a breach of faith. It is
a very serious matter for the treaty-making power to enter into an
engagement calling for action by Congress unless there is every reason
to believe that Congress will act accordingly." C. E. Hughes, Address
in New York, March 26, 1919, on The Proposed Covenant for a League
of Nations, International Conciliation, Special Bulletin, April, 1919,
pp. 689-691. See also Wright, American Journal of Int. Law, 10: 710;
12: 93 et seq. For the general proposition that national legislation or
the lack of it can not affect international obligations ot liabilities se?
discussion in the Alabama Claims Arbitration, 4 Moore, Digest of Inter-
national Arbitrations, 4101; 7 Digest, 878. See also supra note, 23.
5' In the hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Aug. 22, 1919, the following colloquy took place:
"Senator Brandegee. What do you think would have been the result
if we had refused to vote in favor of transferring Shantung to Japan?
Prof. E. T. Williams, expert on far eastern affairs, "Well, of course
it is very difficult to say what would have happened. The Japanese
delegation in Paris probably would not have signed the treaty, and
Great Britain and France felt that they were bound to support Japan's
claim. It would have been an impasse. What would have happened I
can not say." 66th Con., 1st sess., Sen. Doc., No. 106, p. 642. It should
be said that in spite of this opinion Prof. Williams was not in favor of
making the concession to Japan.
52The Canadian minister of Justice said on July 25, 1919: "The
right of Canada as a member of the league to be eligible for representa-
tion on the council under the provisions of the covenant was insisted
upon by her representatives and that those provisions conferred upon her
that right was clearly understood and unequivocably recognized by all
concerned. A reservation in effect negativing that right would involve
further change in the contract-after acceptance and signature by all
parties-in regard to a matter which from the Dominion's point of view
is of its essence. As such it is clearly inadmissible and not distinguish-
able from a refusal to ratify." Press Report July 26, 1919.
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case,-but a moral responsibility is to be decided according to
the conscience of the parties. For this reason on such questions
opinions may properly differ.
It has been pointed out that under normal circumstances the
Senate's right to refuse ratification of a treaty signed under
authority of the President alone is recognized at international
law. But, acting within his recognized constitutional powers,
the President alone has authority to commit the United States to
general lines of policy which may involve the treaty power in
moral responsibilities, should its co6peration be necessary to
make the policy effective. "Protocols of agreement as to the basis
of future negotiation are clearly within the authority of the Presi-
dent" says Crandall,5' citing agreements made with Costa Rica
53 Crandall, op. cit. p. 111; Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the
United States, secs. 200-202, discusses three types of executive agreements
within the constitutional power of the president, as follows:
1. The term "protocol" as used in international law describes "an agree-
ment reached between the foreign offices of two countries which has been
reduced to definite written statement, but has not been ratified as a treaty
by the States parties to it. How far such agreements, though not legally
binding, morally bind the parties to them depends upon the particular
circumstances of each case. The most common use to which protocols
in this sense are put, is in fixing the general terms in which a final treaty
-especially a treaty of peace-is to be negotiated. A recent example of
this is the protocol of 1898 providing for the appointment of a commission
to negotiate the Treaty of Peace with Spain. The constitutional authority
of the President without consulting the Senate to enter into protocols of
agreement as the basis for treaties to be negotiated, is beyond question,
and has repeatedly been exercised without demur from the Senate. "He
cites the Boxer protocol of 1901 and the protocol for the administration
of San Domingan customs houses of 1905 as illustrations and refers to
2 Butler, The Treaty Making Power 371 note, for others.
2. "As the term indicates, a modus vivendi is a temporary arrange-
ment entered into for the purpose of regulating a matter of conflicting
interests, until a more definite and permanent arrangement can be ob-
tained in treaty form. Continued and unquestioned practice supports the
doctrine that these modi vivendi may be entered into by the President
without consulting the Senate." For instances see I Butler 369, note.
3. "In the exercise of his power as Commander-in-Chief of the army
and navy the President of the United States, from both necessity and
convenience, is often called upon to enter into arrangements which are
of an International character. These conventions do not require the ap-
proval of the Senate. A conspicuous, example of international agree-
ments thus entered into is the protocol signed at Pekin in 1901, to which
reference has already been made. All protocols of agreement entered
into for the purpose of furnishing a basis for treaties of peace, as for
example, the Protocol of 1898 with Spain, come under this head. So do
all conventions providing in time of war for an armistice, or the exchange
of prisoners of war, etc. The President's military powers exist in time
of peace as well as during war. And thus, in 1817, the President, without
obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate, was able, by an exchange
,of diplomatic notes, to arrange with England regarding the number of
vessels of war to be kept by the two powers upon the Great Lakes."
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and Nicaragua in reference to future negotiations for the con-
struction of an Isthmian canal, and agreements made with Great
Britain in 1891 in reference to the conclusion of a treaty for
arbitrating the Bering Sea question. The most important agree-
ment of this character was the protocol with Spain of August 12,
1898, "Embodying the terms of a Basis for the Establishment of
Peace" between the two countries. 54 It seems clear that the con-
clusion of armistices and preliminaries or peace are in the power
of the President and constitute obligations upon the conscience
of the United States.
Mr. Lansing's note of November 5, 1918, accepted by the
Allies and Germany as the basis for an armistice and conclusion
of peace was undoubtedly such a commitment. According to its
terms :
"Subject to the qualifications which follow they (the Allied
Governments) declare their willingness to make peace with the
Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the
President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the prin-
ciples of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses."
The Senate in the opinion of the writer is under a moral obli-
gation to approve a treaty along the general lines indicated by the
fourteen points and later addresses of the President. Rejec-
tion of the treaty on the grounds that it does not accord with
these terms as understood by the parties, or amendment to make
it so conform would be unobjectionable from the standpoint of
international ethics, though it might be difficult to prove such dis-
accord inasmuch as the other parties to the agreement of Novem-
ber 5, 1918, have ratified the treaty. But reservation on articles
which are clearly in conformity with the fourteen points can
scarcely be regarded as other than a breach of faith. Of this
character would be a repudiation of article .X of the treaty
5
"
which is an almost literal reproduction of the fourteenth point,"
of January 8, 1918, itself designed to embody the President's.
54 Malloy, Treaties, etc., p. 1688, Crandall, op. cit. p. 103, et seq.
55Official U. S. Bulletin, Nov. 6, 1918; 13 Am. Journ. Int. Law, Supp
95. The "qualifications" referred to freedom of the seas and reparations
They had no reference to the 14th point.
56 "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing politi-
cal independence of all Members of the League."
5 "A general association of nations must be formed under specific
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike."
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proposal of January 22, 1917, for a Monroe Doctrine for the
World.5 8
That reservations of a kind likely to defeat the purpose of
the League of Nations would in effect be a repudiation of the
general responsibility for the reconstruction of world order, which
the United States has assumed through words and action is gen-
erally admitted.
Thus Ex-President Taft has said :
"Surely the United States fought the war to achieve a great
purpose. Surely the treaty of peace is to be the embodiment and
clinching of that purpose. Surely the treaty imposed upon an
unwilling Germany and the other treaties imposed upon reluct-
ant Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey will not enforce themselves.
Who must enforce them, then? The nations who fought the
war. They must continue the league entered into to conduct the
war and now amended and framed to maintain the peace they
won."
SUM MARY. 00
I. From the standpoint of the constitutional law of the Unit-
ed States, the Senate may reject the treaty or make its consent
58 "They (the people of the United States) can not in honor with-
hold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They
do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the
other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will
feel free to render it. That service is nothing less than this, to add their
authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to
guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. . . . And in holding
out the expectation that the people and Government of the -United States
will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the
performance of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak with
the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who
can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions
or our policy as a nation, but a fulfillment, rather, of all that we have
professed or striven for. I am proposing, as it were, that the nations with
one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of
the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other
nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine
its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened,
unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful." In his war message
of April 2, 1917, the President said "I have exactly the same things in
mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the twenty-
second of January last."
59 Letter in Philadelphia Public Ledger, Aug. 27, 1919, printed in
Cong. Rec., Aug. 27, 1919.
50 A former Justice of the Supreme Court, a Senator from Minne-
sota, a former Secretary of State, a former President, and the American
expert on international law at the Paris Conference, have considered the
effect of reservatonis on the treaty. Their conclusions follow:
"It is manifest that attempted reservations will be ineffectual unless
they qualify the act of ratification. The adoption of resolutions by the
Senate setting forth its views will not affect the obligations of the Coy-
TREATY AMENDMENTS AND RESERVATIONS
to ratification conditional upon the consent 6f the signatory
powers to amendments, reservations, or interpretations.
II. From the standpoint of international law, neither the
form nor substance of the modification is material. No amend-
ment, reservation or interpretation of the treaty, however mild,
can bind states which have not assented to it.
enant, if it is in fact ratified without reservations which constitute
part of the instrument of ratification. . . . Assuming that the reserva-
tions are made as a part of the instrument of ratification, the other
parties to the Treaty will be notified accordingly. As a contract the treaty
of course will bind only those who consent to it. The Nation making
reservations as a part of the instrument of ratification is not bound
further than it agrees to be bound. And if a reservation, as a part of the
ratification, makes a material addition to, or a substantial change in the
proposed treaty, other parties will not be bound unless they assent. It
should be added that where a treaty is made on the part of a number of
nations, they may acquiesce in a partial ratification on the part of one
or more. But where there is simply a statement of the interpretation
placed by the ratifying state upon ambiguous clauses in the treaty, whether
or not the statement is called a reservation, the case is really not one of
amendment, and acquiescence of the other parties to the treaty may readily
be inferred unless express objection is made after notice has been received
of the ratification statement forming a part of it. Statements, to safe-
guard our interests, which clarify ambiguous clauses in the Covenant by
setting forth our interpretation of them, and especially when the inter-
pretation is one which is urged by the advocates of the Covenant to induce
support, can meet with no reasonable objection." Letter of Hon. C. E.
Hughes, to Hon. Frederick Hale, Senator from Maine, July 24, 1919.
"No one doubts, of course, that'the Senate has the power to make any
reservations or amendments it sees fit and to make the ratification of the
treaty conditional upon those reservations and amendments. There is
also no question, in my opinion, that where the meaning of the instrument
is at all in doubt the Senate may, by reservation, make a binding declaration
construing the treaty. However, I wish to make perfectly clear that, in
my opinion, where either an amendment or a reservation clearly changes
the meaning of the treaty it will require the instrument to be resubmitted
to all other signatory powers. That such acceptance may be evidenced
either by a formal ratification by the other signatory powers, by exchange
of notes or if not objected to by such powers, and the treaty is put into
operation, such an amendment would undoubtedly be considered as having
been accepted. There are cases in which such reservations do not appear
to have been formally accepted by affirmative action of- the other powers,
but were undoubtedly tacitly accepted by putting the treaty into opera-
tion." Speech of Hon. Frank B. Kellogg, Senator from Minnesota, in the
Senate, Aug. 7, 1919.
"This reservation and these expressions of understanding are in ac-
cordance with long established precedent in the making of treaties. When
included in the instrument of ratification they will not require a reopening
of negotiation, but if none of the other signatories expressly objects to
the ratification with such limitations, the treaty stands as limited as be-
tween the United States and the other powers. If any doubts were enter-
tained as to the effect of such action, the doubt could be readily dispelled
by calling upon the four other principal powers represented in the council
to state whether they do in fact object to the entrance of the United
States into the league with the understandings and reservations stated
in the resolution." Letter of Hon. Elihu Root to Hon. Henry C. Lodge,
June 19, 1919.
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Consent to reservations in the treaty may be given expressly
by formal exchange of notes, or tacitly by acceptance of a formal
note or of a qualified ratification. Amendments or interpreta-
tions not qualifying ratification require express consent; though
subsequent practice, acquiesced in by the parties, and contem-
porary discussion, is admissible evidence of the true meaning of
a treaty.
III. From the ethical .and political standpoint the form of
modification is immaterial but the substance is material. The
United States in the opinion of the writer is under a moral obli-
gation to assume responsibilities under the terms agreed upon as
a basis of peace. To reject the treaty, or to amend it in a manner
contrary to those terms would seem to amount to a repudiation
of these responsibilities.
Signatory states, enemy as well as associated, are under no
obligation, legal, moral or political to consent to amendments,
reservations or interpretations of the treaty, and they are not like-
ly to consent to modifications essentially altering its meaning or
"Speaking generally, I wish to emphasize my conviction that the United
States Senate might well ratify the present treaty, without any reservations
or interpretations. I am confident that the actual operation of the treaty
after ratification would bring about exactly the same result as that which
would be attained by the acceptance of these interpretations and reserva-
tions, but it seems to me to be the part of statesmen to recognize the
exigencies, personal, partisan and political, of a situation in seeking to
achieve real progress and reform." Letter of Hon. William Howard
Taft to Mr. Will Hays, July 20, 1919.
"For practical purposes the difference between an amendment and a
reservation is that, in case of an amendment, the ratification will not take
place unless all the nations signatories to the treaty formally agree that
as to all of them and their obligations the treaty is amended. A ratifica-
tion with reservations is one which is conditioned on a change or a quali-
fication or an interpretation applicable only to the obligations under the
treaty of the nation making the reservation. A reservation really does
not require express acquiescence by any of the other parties if they go on
with the treaty without objection." (Letter of Hon. W. H. Taft to
Philadelphia Public Ledger, Nov. 10, 1919.)
"Any reservations to the treaty of peace with Germany contained in
the instrument of ratification of the United States are in reality proposals
to the other signatories of the treaty, and to that extent involve negotia-
tions with those powers invited to accede to the Covenant. . . . Thus
the form of each instrument of ratification of the treaty with Germany
will be submitted to all the signatory powers, including Germany, for their
consideration, approval and acceptance, and any one of those powers will
have the right to disapprove and refuse to accept. Indeed it is obvious
from the precedents that each signatory power has an interest in consider-
ing the instruments of ratification of the other powers, as its own accept-
ance or rejection of the treaty might depend on reservations contained
in such instruments." Hon. David Hunter Miller, American expert on
International Law at the Paris Conference, Memorandum, Oct. 25, 1919.
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reserving special privileges for one party. Refusal of any signa-
tory to consent to a qualified ratification by the United States
would result in exclusion of the United States from the treaty as
to that signatory.
Interpretative reservations designed in good faith to clarify
the actual meaning of the treaty would presumably be accorded
tacit consent by the other signatories of the treaty.
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